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NOTES
HARASSMENT BY UNIONS AS A REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
UNDER SECTION 8(b)(3) OF THE NLRA*
SECTION 8 of the National Labor Relations Act imposes the duty of collec-
tive bargaining on management and labor.' Section 8(d) defines this duty as
including the requirement that the parties "meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith" regarding wages, hours, or other conditions of employment,
and "the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder." 2
Section 8(a) (5), a provision of the original NLRA, makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain collectively with the represen-
tatives of his employees."'3 In order to equalize the responsibilities of collective
bargaining, a Taft-Hartley Act amendment to the NLRA imposed a correla-
tive duty on the union: section 8(b) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization to "refuse to bargain collectively with an employer."
'4 If
the NLRB determines that either party has engaged in an unfair labor prac-
tice, section 10(c) provides that the Board must issue an order requiring the
offending party to "cease and desist" from this practice and to "take such
affirmative action" as will effectuate the policies of the Act.r
In cases where unions insisted on illegal contract terms such as the closed
*Textile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 109,
34 L.R.R.M. 1059 (May 5, 1954), petition for review filed, No. 12248 (D.C. Cir., May 27,
1954).
1, 61 STAT. 140 (1947),29U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
The original NLRA, the Wagner Act, was enacted by Congress in 1935. 49 STAT. 449
(1935). In 1947, Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley Act,
made extensive amendments to the NLRA. 61 STAT. 136 (1947). Unless otherwise speci-
fled, NLRA will refer to the amended Act.
2. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
3. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952). Under § 8(a) (5), formerly
§ 8(5) of the original NLRA, the employer has been strictly held to the requirement of
good faith in collective bargaining. See, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514,
523-26 (1941) (refusal to sign contract) ; NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.
1941) (mind "hermetically sealed" against reaching agreement). See H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1.947).
4. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952).
The specific purpose of § 8(b) (3) was to make collective bargaining an obligation of
the union as well as of the employer. See text at note 19 infra. Before the LMRA amend-
ments, the NLRA had in some cases been interpreted as requiring, in effect, good faith
bargaining by unions. See Times Publishing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 676, 682-83 (19,17) ; NLRB
v. Express Publishing Co., 128 F.2d 690, 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942).
The general purpose of the LMRA was to correct the alleged inequities in the treat-
ment of employers under the NLRA, as contrasted with the alleged favoritism shown
toward unions. See, generally, NLRB, LEG. HIsT. LMRA (1948); Cox, Some Aspects
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAv. L. REv. 1, 274 (1947-48).
5. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952). Section 10(j) grants the NLRB
power, after issuance of its complaint, to petition in a United States district court for
temporary relief from an alleged unfair labor practice. 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(j) (1952). Under § 10(e), an NLRB order is enforceable in the federal courts upon
petition by the Board. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1952). See, generally,
Teller, The Taft-Hartley Act and "Government by Injunctiotv", 35 VA. L. Rv. 50 (1949).
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shop,6 or where they flatly refused to bargain - or conditioned bargaining on
employer concessions in advance,3 it has been uniformly held that the unions
failed to fulfill their duty of good faith bargaining under section 8(b) (3 1, and
appropriate remedial orders have issued. Moreover, in Phelps Dodge Cop-
per Products Corp.,9 the NLRB held that a union-sponsored slow-down dur-
ing negotiations justified the employer's refusal to bargain further with the
union.10 In the recent case of Personal Products Corp.," the NLRB combined
these two doctrines and held for the first time that it was an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(b) (3) for a union to engage in on-the-job harassment
during a period of collective bargaining negotiations.'-
In Personal Products, the employer and union were negotiating for a new
contract following expiration of the previous contract.13 After three months of
unsuccessful bargaining, the union commenced plant slowdowns and unan-
nounced walkouts, refused to work overtime or special hours, extended rest
periods without authority, and induced a subcontractor's employees not to work
for the employer.' The NLRB found that these devices were designed to "force
the employer's hand" in the existing negotiations, and that they exerted
"strong economic pressure" on the employer by interfering wvith production
plans and delivery commitments.' 5 The Board stated that these "unprotected
harassing tactics" were irreconcilable with the Act's requirement of "reasoned
discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations,"' 0 and therefore
constituted a refusal by the union to bargain in good faith under section
8(b) (3).17 It ordered the union to cease and desist from the above tactics
6. National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforentent granlcd, 175 F2d
686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950) ; Penello v. United Mine Workers,
88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950) ; NLRB v. Puerto Rico S.S. Ass'n, 211 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.
1954).
7. Madden v. United Mine Workers, 79 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C. 1948).
8. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 87 N.LR.B. 972, 978-79 (1949)
(demand for performance bond); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, AFL, 211 F.2d 759
(9th Cir.) (demand that employer bargain for supervisors), cert. denicd, 348 U.S. 839
(1954).
9. 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
10. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 36S (1952).
11. Textile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products Corp., 108 N.L.LB. No.
109, 34 L.R1R.M. 1059 (May 5, 1954) (hereinafter referred to as Personal Products).
12. Id. at 6-7, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1063. One authority sees the possibility of "far-reach-
ing consequences" in the Personal Products application of § 8(b) (3). Cox, L,nR LAw
427 (3d ed. 1954).
13. Intermediate Report, p. 8, Textile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products
Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 34 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1059-60 (May 5, 1954).
14. Textile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products Corp., 108 N.LR.B. No. 109,
p. 4, 34 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1062 (May 5, 1954). Each of these tactics is generally held un-
protected, thus permitting the discharge of the participants. See cases cited note 30 infra.
15. Textile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products Corp., 108 N.LR.B. No.
109, pp. 4-5,34 L.RR.M. 1059, 1062 (May 5, 1954).
16. Id. at 5, 34 L.R.RA. at 1062-63. The NLRB here was quoting Phelps Dodge
Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
17. Textile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products Corp., 108 N.LR.B. NQ.
109, pp. 6-7, 34 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1063 (May 5, 1954).
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and from "any similar or related conduct in derogation of the statutory duty
to bargain."18
The NLRB justified its holding in Personal Products by referring to the
clear congressional intent of section 8(b) (3) to impose on unions the same
duty to bargain in good faith which section 8(a) (5) had imposed on em-
ployers.19 Management's obligation to bargain in good faith has been extended
to activities far removed from the bargaining table. Thus employers' anti-
union threats and promises to employees have been held to be evidence of bad
faith under section 8(a) (5), and appropriate remedial orders have issued.
20
Personal Products similarly extends the union's obligation to bargain under
section 8(b) (3) by condemning union harassing tactics which, although they
do not occur at the bargaining table, obstruct the bargaining process.21
The attitude of the Eightieth Congress toward the specific problem of harass-
ment appears unclear. Section 12 of the House version of Taft-Hartley, a pot-
pourri aimed at a large number of activities felt to be harmful to industrial
peace, provided that a sit-down strike or "other concerted interference with
an employer's operations conducted by remaining on the employer's premises"
was subject to damage suit and injunction. 22 The Senate-House Conference
Committee deleted section 12.23 However, this would not seem to indicate
congressional intent to shield on-the-job harassment from NLRB remedial
action, since the grounds for deletion were that many of the activities pro-
18. Id. at 9-10,34 L.R.R.M. at 1065.
19. See statement of Senator Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 3838 (1947), and Senator Ellender,
id. at 4135. See also H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947) ; National Mari-
time Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 980-82 (1948), enforcement granted, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950) ; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REV. 274, 282-83 (1948).
The "good faith" requirement, now a part of § 8(d), was not in the original NLRA,
but was read into the Act by the NLRB in the early cases. E.g., International Filter
Co., 1. N.L.R.B. 489,498 (1936).
The Board in Personal Products noted that § 8(d)'s standards of good faith were ap-
plicable to unions as well as to employers. 108 N.L.R.B. No. 109, p. 3, 34 L.R.R.M. 1059,
1062 (May 5, 1954). See text at note 2 supra.
20. Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 652 (1942); Geigy Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 822 (1952), enforcement granted as modi-
fied, 211 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954). And see cases cited note
34 infra.
21. In addition to the harassing tactics in Personal Products, the doctrine of the case
might be extended to other types of unprotected union action, such as refusal to handle
struck goods, NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 F.2d 486, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1946),
refusal to obey company rules, Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947), defamation of the employer, Jefferson
Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1951), aff'd on other grounds sub nore.
NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL, 346 U.S. 464 (1953),
and attacks on the employer's property, NLRB v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 145 F.2d 66,
71-73 (4th Cir. 1944).
22. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1947), 1 NLRB, LEG. HIsT. LMRA 204
(1948).
23. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1947).
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scribed by this section were covered elsewhere in the Act and were unprotected
under existing case law. 24 And the broad equalizing aims of section 8(b) (3)
imply that Congress intended to put an end to this disruptive union conduct.Y
The union in Personal Products could have alked out on strike to enforce
its bargaining demands without being accused of bad faith. -? 0 Strikes to enforce
bargaining demands constitute activity protected under the NLRA, and em-
ployers must reinstate all strikers except those whose positions have been filled
or abolished during the strike.2 7 However, despite the fact that the NLRB at
one time tended to look upon some types of on-the-job harassment during bar-
gaining periods as not so indefensible as to justify discharge of the participat-
ing employees,2 8 more recent decisions have expressed the view that employees
should not be allowed to continue to accept wages and at the same time disrupt
production schedules by slowdowns, refusals to do certain types of work, or
other insubordinate conduct.L2 9 Because of this distinction, employers have
been held to have the right to discharge employees engaging in these activi-
ties.
30
24. Ibid. And see id. at 42-43, for further discussion of § 12, indicating that the Con-
ference Committee felt that many § 12 activities had been adequately covered by the con-
ference agreement.
25. See text at note 19 supra. For congressional policy generally, see H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1947). In International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (hereinafter referred to as Briggs Strat-
ton), the Supreme Court, after discussing the legislative history of the LMlRA, held that
harassment was subject to injunction under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, since
Congress had not subjected it to NLRB control in the LMRA. The Board in Personal
Products distinguished Briggs Stratton on the grounds that the Supreme Court there had
not been faced with a situation where the harassment obstructed good faith bargaining. Tex-
tile Workers Union, CIO, and Personal Products Corp., 10 N.L.R.B. No. 109, pp. 6-7, 34
L.R.M. 1059,1063 (Mlay 5,1954).
26. See, generally, NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393, 403-04 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954); Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91
F.2d 134, 140 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937). Since no contract was in
force between the parties, the provisions of § 8(d) requiring sixty days' notice prior to
striking, would not seem to be applicable to such a strike. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§158(d) (1952).
27. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1938);
NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd,
346 U.S. 818 (1953). However, strikers who commit acts of violence usually need not be
rehired. Local 3, United Packinghouse Workers, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325, 331 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954).
28. See Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 685-87 (1938) (refusal to work over-
time); Armour & Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 989, 994-96 (1940) (brief slowdown).
29. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1946);
C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 390, 397-98 (7th Cir. 1939).
30. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-58 (1939); NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
333, 337-38 (1950). But where the unprotected activity was provoked by an employer's
unfair labor practice, the employees, in some cases, have been reinstated. NLRB v. Elkland
Leather Co., 114 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). See generally
Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. LJ. 319 (1951) ; Note, 29 IND.
L.J. 284 (1954).
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Since the harassing in Personal Products occurred while the parties were
actually bargaining, it might be reasoned that the decision holds no more than
that harassment during a period of negotiation violates section 8(b) (3). How-
ever, a broader reading of Personal Products seems justifiable. Harassment
is almost always aimed at negotiation; its purpose is to coerce management
into agreeing to change wages, hours, or working conditions.3' Bargaining
sessions must be held in order to effectuate these desired changes. Because
section 8(d) imposes a continuous duty upon unions as well as employers to
hold themselves ready to bargain on new issues or on the interpretation of
existing contract terms, 32 harassing, whenever practiced, might be viewed as
contrary to the union's duty to confer in good faith with the employer.83 The
fact that the union has failed to make a specific demand for negotiations should
not lessen the employer's right to insist that it bargain in good faith. Holding
that union harassment at any time is an unfair labor practice seems analogous
to the decisions holding that unilateral management action in making wage
increases or changing hours or working conditions constitutes a refusal to bar-
gain under section 8(a) (5) even when the union has not requested collective
bargaining on these issues.
34
Where union harassment occurs during the term of a contract, more specific
justification for applying section 8(b) (3) may be found in the language of
section 8(d) (4). This section provides that where there is a collective bar-
gaining contract in effect, a union cannot strike "for a period of sixty days"
after giving notice of proposed contract modifications "or until the expiration
date of such contract, whichever occurs later.' '31 It has been held a section
8(d) (4) violation for a union to strike during the term of its contract.,, Since
31. International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 245, 248-50 (1949).
32. NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1952) (new issues); § 8(d),
61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952), quoted in text at note 2 supra (contract
interpretation) ; NLRB v. Highland Shoe, Inc., 119 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1941) (same).
33. Union harassing would seem to be the antithesis of the good faith that § 8(d) ex-
pressly demands. See International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, 336 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1949); Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101
N.L.R.B. 360, 368 (1952) ; Cox, supra note 30, at 338-39; TELtm, A LABOR PoLcIC FOR
AiiERICA 96 (1945).
34. May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1945) (wage increase),
Krimm Lumber Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1579 (1952), enforced, 203 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1953) (same); Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 627, 636-40 (1946)
(bonus) ; cf. cases cited note 21 supra.
Where the union has requested collective bargaining on a proper subject, unilateral
action clearly is a § 8(a) (5) violation. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678, 684 (1944) (wage increase) ; NLRB v. National Shoes, Inc., 208 F.2d 688, 692 (2d
Cir. 1953) (same). See generally Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining
by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 395-96 (1950).
35. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (4) (1952).
36. Local 3, United Packinghouse Workers, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954) ; cf. Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 34 L.R.R.M.




"strike" is defined in the Act as including "any concerted slow-down or other
concerted interruption of operations by employees,"3 7 harassing tactics such as
those occurring in Personal Products would seem to fall within the interdiction
of section 8(d) (4). 38 Furthermore, since the employer has the option of turn-
ing union harassment into a technical strike by shutting down, he could thus
bring harassment expressly under section 8(d) (4).39
An employer has the option of shutting down during a noncontract period,
as well as when a contract is in force, when faced with harassment. However,
in both these situations it seems more consonant ith the NLRA's fundamen-
tal policy of minimizing the effect of industrial strife 40 if the employer is per-
mitted to restrain the activity under section 8(b) (3) rather than required to
shut down in order to stop harassment.41 The employer could refrain from
asking the NLRB to take action against harassment if he preferred to operate
in the face of this conduct.
No amount of NLRB prohibition of union harassment will necessarily bring
about the spirit of reasonableness during negotiations upon which collective
bargaining depends. Moreover, the primary responsibility for collective bar-
gaining must rest with management and labor rather than with the Board. 2
However, the possibility of reasonable negotiations may be increased if the
NLRB has power to restrain the most flagrant obstructions to good faith bar-
gaining.
37. LMRA § 501, 61 STAT. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 142 (1952). The legislative his-
tory of the LMRA is not clear as to whether § 501 definitions apply only to Titles II, III,
& IV, or also to Title I, which amended the NLRA. Compare Conference Report, H.R.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1947), with S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
30 (1947). The Supreme Court in Briggs Stratton, suPra note 25, at 258, appeared to use
§ 501 definitions in construing Title I.
While some courts have stated that harassment does not constitute a strike within the
NLRA meaning, see, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 Ff2d 486, 497 (8th
Cir. 1946), the better approach is to consider harassment a strike, but to hold it unpro-
tected, see International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 245, 258-60 (1949); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254-
57 (1939).
38. See text at note 14 supra.
39. See International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
333 (1950) ; C.G. Com, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 Ff2d 390, 397 (1939). Such a strike would
properly be termed an illegal strike allowing the employer to discharge the strikers, rather
than an economic strike, where he would be required to reinstate them. See text at note
27 supra. Prior to Personal Products, the only remedy for the harassed employer was a
shutdown and mass discharge. See text at note 30 supra.
40. NLRA § 1, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). Note especially para-
graph four, which was added by the LM6RA amendments. And see LMRA, Short Title
and Declaration of Policy, § 1(b), 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1952);
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939).
41. Moreover, a shutdown may often prove unfeasible for the employer. See Note,
29 IxN. L.J. 284, 291-93 (1954) ; cf. Note, 63 YAx.a L.J. 11,6 (1954).
42. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collecti'e Bargaining by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 425-32 (1950).
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